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Past the Tipping Point, but With Hope 
of Return:  How Creating a 
Geoengineering Compulsory Licensing 
Scheme Can Incentivize Innovation 
Brooke Wilson* 
Abstract 
This Note explores the patenting of geoengineering technologies 
and issues arising from the early stages of this high-risk, 
high-reward technology. This Note focuses on one possible solution 
to solving the issues surrounding the patenting of geoengineering 
technology:  Creating a specialized compulsory licensing scheme. 
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I. Introduction 
As of February 2021, the Keutsch Research Group at Harvard 
University is on track to launch one of the biggest outdoor tests of 
stratospheric aerosol injection.1 The project is called Stratospheric 
Controlled Perturbation Experiment (SCoPEx) and will simulate 
the cloaking effect of a volcano eruption.2 A high-altitude balloon 
will lift an instrument package approximately twenty kilometers 
into the atmosphere and release a very small amount of material 
to create a perturbed air mass roughly one kilometer long and one 
 
 1. See Jonathan Watts, US and Saudi Arabia blocking regulation of 
geoengineering, sources say, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 18, 2019 2:00 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/mar/18/us-and-saudi-arabia-
blocking-regulation-of-geoengineering-sources-say (“US academics at Harvard 
are also poised to conduct the biggest outdoor test of stratospheric aerosol 
injection, which simulates the cloaking effect of a volcano eruption.”) 
[https://perma.cc/B6RC-HDNW]; see also Keutsch Research Group, SCoPEx, 
HARV. U., https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/keutschgroup/scopex (last visited Feb. 
20, 2021) (describing a proposed platform test in Sweden in June 2021) 
[hereinafter SCoPEx] [perma.cc/6Q8H-2XDY]. 
 2. See Watts, supra note 1 (identifying the Harvard experiment). 
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hundred meters in diameter.3 The purpose of the experiment is to 
observe how particles interact with one another; to measure 
changes such as aerosol density, atmospheric chemistry, and light 
scattering; and to test whether it is possible to find aerosols that 
can reduce or eliminate ozone loss without increasing other 
physical risks.4 This project has the potential to improve 
knowledge relevant to estimating the overall effectiveness and 
risks of solar geoengineering.5 
The Keutsch Group’s project is monumental in several ways. 
A successful test could spark the development of more 
geoengineering technology, large-scale schemes designed and 
aimed at reducing the effects of climate change.6 Once deployed, 
SCoPEx would be one of the first experiments to collect real data 
and compare those results to existing computer generated models.7 
If successful, SCoPEx could “create a template for how 
geoengineering research is conducted going forward, and perhaps 
pave the way for more experiments to follow.”8 Further, SCoPEx 
illuminates that private businesses, institutions, and inventors are 
driving the new wave of geoengineering and climate engineering 
technology, and SCoPEx illuminates the role intellectual property 
plays in developing geoengineering technology.9 
 
 3. See SCoPEx, supra note 1 (answering general questions about the 
purpose and objectives of the experiment). 
 4. See id. (explaining the purpose and highlighting the concerns regarding 
the project). 
 5. See id. (answering the question of whether SCoPEx will test 
geoengineering itself). 
 6. See id. (explaining that the group hopes to learn more about 
stratospheric aerosol physics and chemistry to improve large-scale models). 
 7. See id. (“Computer modeling and laboratory work tell us some very 
useful things about solar geoengineering, but as with all other aspects of 
environmental science, computer models ultimately rest on observations of the 
real environment.”). 
 8. James Temple, Geoengineering is very controversial. How can you do 
experiments? Harvard has some ideas., MIT TECH. R. (July 29, 2019), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/614025/geoengineering-experiment-
harvard-creates-governance-committee-climate-change/ [perma.cc/2RBN-9L27]. 
 9. See id. (observing that there is not “any public oversight body set up to 
weigh the particularly complex questions surrounding such a proposal”); see also 
SCoPEx, supra note 1 (explaining how the intellectual property from the SCoPEx 
project is being managed). 
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Throughout history, developments in technology have been 
imperative to solving societal problems.10 Today, one of the most 
pressing threats to society is climate change where “the most 
extreme risks of climate change can’t be ruled out—including the 
collapse of human civilization.”11 Geoengineering technology 
provides a possible solution to slowing and mitigating the effects 
of climate change.12 With the lack of government oversight, private 
actors and intellectual property will have a substantial role in the 
research, development, and potential implementation of 
geoengineering technologies.13 Yet, issues have developed and are 
continuing to develop with patenting geoengineering (also 
commonly referred to as climate-engineering) technologies.14 The 
challenge becomes how to safely incentivize innovation in a field of 
technology that could have profound local and global effects. 
 
 10. See e.g., Claudia Flavell-While, Fritz Haber and Carl Bosch–Feed the 
World, THE CHEM. ENG’R (Mar. 1, 2010), 
https://www.thechemicalengineer.com/features/cewctw-fritz-haber-and-carl-
bosch-feed-the-world/ (“[The Haber-Bosch process] made it possible for the first 
time to produce synthetic fertilisers and produce sufficient food for the Earth’s 
growing population.”) [perma.cc/5NAF-A3YM]; see also Howard Markel, The real 
story behind penicillin, PBS NEWSHOUR (Sept. 27, 2013), 
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/health/the-real-story-behind-the-worlds-first-
antibiotic (“The discovery of penicillin, one of the world’s first antibiotics, marks 
a true turning point in human history—when doctors finally had a tool that could 
completely cure their patients of deadly infectious diseases.”) [perma.cc/UWN4-
KU32]. 
 11. Katia Dmitrieva, JPMorgan Warns of Climate as a Threat to ‘Human 
Life as We Know It’, BLOOMBERG GREEN (Feb. 21, 2020, 2:44 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-21/jpmorgan-warns-of-
climate-threat-to-human-life-as-we-know-it [perma.cc/WH3F-M5NL]. 
 12. See Rima Sabina Aouf, Five Geoengineering Solutions Proposed to Fight 
Climate Change, DEZEEN (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.dezeen.com/2018/10/18/five-
geoengineering-solutions-climate-change-un-ipcc-technology/ (“The United 
Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report highlighted 
geoengineering as a necessary Plan B if temperature rises can’t be capped at a 
manageable level.”) [perma.cc/NP8B-YZDU]. 
 13. See Jesse L. Reynolds, Jorge L. Contreras, & Joshua D. Sarnoff, 
Intellectual Property Policies for Solar Geoengineering, WILEY 1, 2, 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/wcc.512 (last updated Dec. 12, 
2017) (explaining the lack of governance will lead to intellectual property and 
private actors to play a growing role) [perma.cc/MS7D-J3VA]. 
 14. See Anthony E. Chavez, Exclusive Rights to Saving the Planet:  The 
Patenting of Geoengineering Inventions, 13 N.W. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 9–17 
(2015) (describing the development and issues of patenting geoengineering 
technology). 
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This Note explores one possible solution to the issues involved 
in patenting geoengineering technology. Part II provides context 
for the growing threat of climate change and how geoengineering 
technologies are defined. Part III describes the current status of 
geoengineering patents, the unique issues pertaining to patenting 
Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) and Solar Radiation Management 
(SRM) technology, and the recommendations that have been 
previously provided in the literature. Part IV proposes an approach 
to address issues with patenting geoengineering technology and 
how to continue to safely promote innovation. 
II. Background 
A. The Growing Threat of Climate Change 
Global climate change has become an increasing threat to the 
United States and the world.15 In 1990, in response to President 
Reagan’s proposal for a U.S. Global Change Research Program 
(USGCRP), Congress passed the United States Global Change 
Research Act (GCRA) with the goal of “improv[ing] understanding 
of global change.”16 The federal program coordinates federal 
research and invests in understanding the “forces shaping the 
 
 15. See U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE 
ASSESSMENT:  CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (Jerry M. 
Melillo et al. eds., 2014) (identifying the observed and projected climate change 
impacts for specific regions across the United States) [hereinafter THIRD 
NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT]; see also Climate Change, UNITED NATIONS, 
https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/climate-change/ (last visited Oct. 25, 
2019) (“Climate Change is the defining issue of our time and we are at a defining 
moment.”) [perma.cc/S7M8-MLXN]. 
 16. 15 U.S.C. § 2933 (2018); see John P. Holdren, Tamara Dickinson, Mike 
Kuperberg, & Afua Bruce, Celebrating the 25th Anniversary of the U.S. Global 
Change Research Program, THE WHITE HOUSE PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA (Nov. 
16, 2015 9:50 AM), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015/11/16/celebrating-25th-
anniversary-us-global-change-research-program (“Twenty-five years ago today, 
the landmark Global Change Research Act (GCRA) was signed into law by 
President George H.W. Bush, formally mandating the U.S. Global Change 
Research Program (USGCRP) that had been proposed in President Reagan’s final 
budget.”) [perma.cc/G9JN-R92X]. 
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global environment, both human and natural, and their impacts 
on society.”17 
In 2014, the USGCRP released the Third National Climate 
Assessment:  Climate Change Impacts in the United States.18 The 
report illustrated that over the last fifty years, the atmospheric 
concentration of heat-trapping gases, such as carbon dioxide, 
methane, and nitrous oxide, has skyrocketed, resulting in an 
increase in the global annual average temperature.19 Weather 
patterns, incidents of extreme weather, and amount of 
precipitation are predicted to change and increase.20 Along with 
these physical effects, climate change will have drastic societal, 
health, and economic effects, which will disproportionately affect 
certain people and communities including children, the sick, the 
poor, and some communities of Color.21 Particularly 
climate-related hazards will exacerbate other stressors.22 
In 2014, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) released the Fifth Assessment Report, which evaluated the 
shifting patterns of risk and potential benefits since the last 
assessment in 2007.23 The report explained that there was a very 
 
 17. About USGCRP, U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RES. GRP., GLOBALCHANGE.GOV, 
https://www.globalchange.gov/about [hereinafter About USGCRP] 
[perma.cc/L3E7-43XW]. 
 18. See generally THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, supra note 15 
(discussing the impact and future impact climate change will have on the United 
States). 
 19. See id. at 23 (“The majority of the warming at the global scale over the 
past 50 years can only be explained by the effects of human influences . . . [t]he 
emissions from human influences that are affecting the climate include heat 
trapping gases . . . .”). 
 20. See id. at 25–49 (explaining the current and predicted consequences of 
climate change including increased annual temperatures, changes in average 
annual precipitation, lengthening of the frost-free season, more frequent heavy 
downpours and extreme weather events, more intense and frequent hurricanes, 
rising sea levels, decreased ice volume, and increases in ocean acidification). 
 21. See id. at 221 (explaining how climate change threatens human health 
and identifying groups specifically vulnerable). 
 22. See Lennart Olsson, Livelihoods and Poverty, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014:  
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY. PART A:  GLOBAL AND SECTORAL 
ASPECTS. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT 
OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 796 (C.B. Field et al. eds., 
Cambridge University Press 2014) (“Climate-related hazards exacerbate other 
stressors, often with negative outcomes for livelihoods, especially for people living 
in poverty (high confidence).”). 
 23. See generally id. (summarizing the changes that have occurred since 
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high likelihood, based on robust evidence and high agreement, that 
“climate change and climate variability worsen existing poverty, 
exacerbate inequalities, and trigger both new vulnerabilities and 
some opportunities for individuals and communities.”24 While 
people may have economic disadvantages due to different 
circumstances and are not equally affected, “[c]limate change 
interacts with non-climatic stressors and entrenched structural 
inequalities to shape vulnerabilities.”25 
Projections about the pattern of poverty across the globe vary 
substantially.26 Yet, there has been a shift in distribution of global 
poverty, which has challenged the view that the world’s poorest 
people live in the poorest countries.27 These trends suggest “that 
substantial pockets of poverty persist in countries with higher 
levels of average per capita income.”28 Additionally since 2005, 
between-country inequality has been decreasing, but 
within-country inequality fluctuates based on geographic 
location.29 Within-country inequality is rising in Asia, falling in 
Latin America, and difficult to discern in sub-Saharan Africa.30 
These two factors—poverty and persistent inequality—are the 
“most salient of the conditions that shape climate-related 
vulnerability.”31 
When poor and marginalized people face a climate hazard, 
even a modest one, they usually have the least buffer to face, the 
fewest assets to liquidate in times of hardship or crisis, and suffer 
 
2007 because of climate change). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See id. at 801 (advising caution when requiring poverty projections due 
to the different means these projections use and the diverse conceptions of poverty 
itself). 
 27. See id. (explaining the shift in global poverty toward middle income 
countries and an increase in relative poverty in high income countries). 
 28. Id. 
 29. See id. at 802 (explaining the trends for between-country and 
within-country inequality between 2005 and 2014). 
 30. See id. (“However, within-country inequality is rising in Asia, especially 
[C]hina, albeit from relatively low levels, and is falling in Latin America, albeit 
from very high levels, while trends in sub-Saharan Africa are difficult to discern 
regionally . . . .”). 
 31. Id. 
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the most from successive events with limited recovery time.32 
Climate change, climate variability, and extreme events affect 
several aspects of a person’s life.33 They can negatively affect 
natural assets (such as lakes and rivers where certain livelihoods 
depend directly), damage physical assets (including homes and 
farms), erode financial assets (losses of farms and jobs and 
increased costs of living due to expenses like funerals), result in 
damage to human assets (food insecurity, undernourishment, 
spikes in food prices, anxiety, depression), and erode social and 
cultural assets (disrupting social networks which prevent the 
mobilization of labor and reciprocal gifts).34 Overall, these can have 
the effect of keeping poor people in a poverty trap.35 It is projected 
that climate change will slow economic growth and poverty 
reduction and create new poverty pockets between 2014 and 2100, 
in developing and developed countries.36 
Additionally, developing countries may experience 
disproportionate and unequal impacts of climate change.37 
Developing countries that have set to achieve the United Nation’s 
Sustainable Development Goals, are being severely hampered by 
the adverse effects of climate change.38 Statements taken from 
 
 32. See id. (“People who are poor and marginalized usually have the least 
buffer to face even modest climate hazards and suffer the most from successive 
events with little time for recovery.”). 
 33. See id. at 803 (“Climate change, climate variability, and extreme events 
interact with numerous aspects of people’s livelihoods.”). 
 34. See id. (describing the different aspects of one’s life climate change 
affects). 
 35. See id. at 806 (“Poverty traps arise when climate change, variability, and 
extreme events keep poor people poor and make some poor even poorer.”). 
 36. See id. at 796–97 (describing how “[c]limate change will create new poor 
between now and 2100, in developing and developed countries, and jeopardize 
sustainable development”).  
 37. See Climate Change and the Developing World:  A Disproportionate 
Impact, U.S. GLOB. LEADERSHIP COAL. (March 2020), 
https://www.usglc.org/blog/climate-change-and-the-developing-world-a-
disproportionate-impact/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2021) (“While global leadership on 
climate change will require multi-faceted policy solutions, there is consensus that 
extreme weather and disruption from drought, flooding, and conflicts over natural 
resources disproportionately affect the developing world, particularly the poor 
and most vulnerable including women and children.”) [perma.cc/464D-HC94]. 
 38. See Unprecedented Impacts of Climate Change Disproportionately 
Burdening Developing Countries, Delegate Stresses, as Second Committee 
Concludes General Debate, UNITED NATIONS (Oct. 8, 2019), 
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delegates from over a dozen countries at the United Nations’ 
General Assembly Second Committee meeting highlighted the vast 
ways which climate change was affecting each country and the 
pressing need to address these issues.39 While the issues voiced at 
the assembly were tailored to each country, there was an overall 
sense of urgency and hope for a unified global initiative.40 
Further, there is a sense that the globe may have surpassed a 
threshold for a cascade of inter-related tipping points.41 The 
concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has increased 
by over forty percent since 1750.42 While the planet is capable of 
adapting and absorbing changes to its atmosphere, the rate at 
which it has had to do so to keep constant is unsustainable.43 
Additionally, as more carbon dioxide is displaced into the 
atmosphere, the temperature will rise, resulting in less effective 
carbon sinks—reservoirs, typically natural, that absorb more 
carbon dioxide from the atmosphere than they release.44 This can 
create a “’feedback loop’—a cyclical process triggered by 
environmental change that leads back to more change.”45 For 
example, scientists had once assumed that oceans would absorb 
carbon dioxide and slow global warming.46 However, due to 
 
https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/gaef3516.doc.htm (explaining Botswana’s 
concerns and observations of the effects of climate change on their country’s 
efforts to reach their sustainability goals) [hereinafter Unprecedented Impacts of 
Climate Change] [perma.cc/JD6U-K2GJ]. 
 39. See id. (summarizing the statements from delegates of many nations). 
 40. See id. (describing the statements from delegates and where many 
concluded that drastic measures need to be taken). 
 41. See Fred Pearce, As Climate Change Worsens, A Cascade of Tipping 
Points Looms, YALE ENV’T 360 (Dec. 5, 2019), https://e360.yale.edu/features/as-
climate-changes-worsens-a-cascade-of-tipping-points-looms (quoting researchers 
who are studying the earth’s climate and consider several different “tipping 
points” to be interrelated) [perma.cc/WX2Q-8L4Y]. 
 42. See DAVID HUNTER, DURWOOD ZAELKE, & JAMES SALZMAN, INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 4 (5th ed. 2015) (“Due to the burning of fossil 
fuels, such as coal and oil, and the destruction of forests, the atmospheric 
concentration CO2 has increased by nearly 40%, from 280 parts per million (ppm) 
to 395 ppm between 1750 and 2013, . . . .”). 
 43. See id. at 28–29 (describing how regular carbon sinks may not be able to 
keep up). 
 44. See id. (describing one scenario where a rising temperature will further 
reduce the oceans ability to absorb carbon dioxide). 
 45. Id. at 29. 
 46. See id. (explaining how increased temperatures will decrease the ocean’s 
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increased global temperatures, the currents that carry carbon 
dioxide from the ocean surface and into the depths have slowed, 
and the ocean’s “ability to absorb [carbon dioxide] may be reduced 
by as much as 50%.”47 
Climate change presents global issues that will affect all 
peoples, but more significant those who are socioeconomically 
disadvantaged.48 While conventional actions must be taken to 
reduce emissions and rein in consumption, technology will be 
crucial in reducing emission levels, minimizing the effects of 
climate change, and addressing issues that arise once climate 
crises have begun. 
B. What Is Geoengineering? 
When geoengineering and climate engineering are referenced 
today, the terms typically refer to large-scale schemes designed 
and aimed at reducing the effects of climate change.49 Unlike the 
historic impact humankind has had on the environment, “the 
climate effects of geoengineering are not considered incidental side 
effects, but instead constitute intended results.”50 These projects 
may range from schemes designed to remove carbon dioxide from 
 
ability to absorb carbon dioxide). 
 47. Id. 
 48. See the Facts:  How Climate Change Affects People Living in Poverty, 
MERCY CORPS (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.mercycorps.org/blog/climate-change-
poverty#:~:text=Climate%20change%20threatens%20the%20cleanliness,and%2
0pushes%20people%20into%20poverty (“And it's people living in poverty who 
have the most to lose [due to impacts of climate change]. For those on the 
frontlines of the crisis, the struggle to earn a living, feed their families and create 
safe and stable homes is made more difficult every day.”) [perma.cc/4TR3-8CF3]. 
 49. See What is geoengineering?, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 18, 2011, 05:48 AM),  
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/feb/18/geo-engineering 
(“Geoengineering schemes are projects designed to tackle the effects of climate 
change directly . . . .”) [perma.cc/X54G-RQNL]; see also What is Geoengineering?, 
GEOENGINEERING MONITOR, http://www.geoengineeringmonitor.org/what-is-
geoengineering/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2019) (“Climate geoengineering refers to 
large-scale schemes for intervention in the earth’s oceans, soils and atmosphere 
with the aim of reducing the effects of climate change, usually temporarily.”) 
[perma.cc/HY3H-2MJF]. 
 50. Gerd Winter, Climate Engineering and International Law:  Last Resort 
or the End of Humanity?, 20 RECIEL 277, 297 (2011). 
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the air, commonly referred to as Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR)51, 
to schemes designed to reduce the amount of sunlight reaching the 
Earth, commonly referred to as Solar Radiation Management 
(SRM).52 Despite the wide variety in schemes, “the prominent new 
trait of climate engineering is its enormous depth of intervention 
into the natural course of the biosphere.”53 
Yet, there are important differences between certain types of 
CDR and SRM technologies.54 Some technologies, such as 
technology for direct air capture of carbon dioxide that filters the 
air and removes carbon dioxide, can be considered clean 
technology.55 This type of technology typically creates a local 
impact that can be measured reasonably accurately.56 Existing 
regulations on similar industries like power plants, paper mills, 
and chemical plants may also be more easily applied to a carbon 
sequestration plant using this type of technology.57 Whereas solar 
geoengineering, such as stratospheric aerosols, attempts to alter 
the entire climate by reflecting back light from the sun into the 
 
 51. See id. at 278 (“Large-scale afforestation, BECS biochar, enhanced 
weathering, CO2 air capture, ocean fertilization and CCS are all described as 
‘Carbon Dioxide Removal’ (CDR) . . . .”). 
 52. See What is geoengineering?, supra note 49 (“Geoengineering schemes 
are projects designed to tackle the effects of climate change directly, usually by 
removing CO2 from the air or limiting the amount of sunlight reaching the 
planet’s surface.”); Winter, supra note 50, at 279 (“[W]hereas increasing surface 
and cloud albedo, the methods of injecting stratospheric aerosols and installing 
space reflectors are known as ‘Solar Radiation Management’ (SRM).”). 
 53. Winter, supra note 50, at 279. 
 54. See David Keith, Why I Am Proud to Commercialize Direct Air Capture 
while I Oppose Any Commercial Work on Solar Geoengineering, HARV. U. (June 4, 
2018), https://keith.seas.harvard.edu/blog/why-i-am-proud-commercialize-direct-
air-capture-while-i-oppose-any-commercial-work-solar (discussing the 
differences between direct air capture and solar geoengineering technology) 
[perma.cc/Q9K4-2YFL]; see also Albert C. Lin, Does Geoengineering Present a 
Moral Hazard?, 40 ECOLOGY L. Q. 676–77 (2013) (highlighting the issues 
particularly with ocean fertilization, a type of CDR, and stratospheric aerosol 
deployment, a type of SRM). 
 55. See Keith, supra note 54 (explaining why direct air capture technology is 
similar to clean energy technology). 
 56. See id. (“When Carbon Engineering succeeds and large-scale air capture 
plants are built, it will be very easy for outside entities such as governments, 
third-parties, or citizen groups to monitor the net flows of energy and materials 
in and out of the plant . . . .”). 
 57. See id. (stating that there are applicable regulations already in place). 
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atmosphere.58 “Solar geoengineering is large-scale climate 
modification which inherently has global consequences that are 
difficult to quantify even after deployment.”59 Therefore, as 
different forms of geoengineering technology have different 
potential consequences and implications, different mechanisms 
should be in place to regulate and commercialize these 
technologies.60 
While new geoengineering technology is being developed today 
for climate change, the concept of geoengineering and use of this 
technology is not novel.61 In October of 1966, the United States 
conducted the test phase for “Project Popeye,” a weather 
modification experiment.62 During the test phase, the U.S. 
government conducted over fifty cloud seeding experiments where 
82% of the seeded clouds produced rain.63 The purpose of the 
project was to increase normal rainfall in North Vietnam to 
“inhibit overland vehicular movement and to reinforce the 
bottlenecks already created at stream crossings . . . .”64 In 1976, 
the United Nations General Assembly condemned “Project 
Popeye.”65 Major countries such as the United States and Russia, 
created and ratified the Environmental Modification Convention 
(ENMOD) treaty, which prohibited nations from deliberately 
altering weather for hostile purposes.66 From 1976 to 2010, there 
were no substantial developments within the United States 
 
 58. See id. (“Solar geoengineering is not cleantech . . . . It’s a set of 
technologies that might allow humanity to alter the entire climate.”). 
 59. Id. 
 60. See id. (arguing that solar geoengineering should not be commercialized). 
 61. See Mollie Bloudoff-Indelicato, Controlling the Controllers:  A Timeline 
of Geoengineering Rules and Regulations Worldwide, SCI. AM. (Oct. 25, 2012), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/geoengineering-worldwide-rules-
regulations-timeline/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2021) (providing a timeline of the 
history of geoengineering in the United States) [perma.cc/ZNY6-FGAN]. 
 62. See 274. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for 
Political Affairs (Kohler) to Secretary of State Rusk, OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN, DEP’T. 
OF STATE (Jan. 13, 1967), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-
68v28/d274 (describing and requesting permission for Project Popeye) 
[hereinafter “Project Popeye”] [perma.cc/K9L8-RVQZ]. 
 63. See id. (describing the test phase). 
 64. Id. 
 65. See Bloudoff-Indelicato, supra note 61 (summarizing the United States’ 
history with geoengineering). 
 66. See id. (summarizing the United States’ history with geoengineering). 
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regarding their policy or role in geoengineering.67 However, in 
2010, a 193-member U.N. Convention on Biodiversity agreed to 
ban climate-related geoengineering activities.68 The Convention 
aimed to ban geoengineering on the grounds of “unknown 
environmental impacts” that could benefit one country but destroy 
another.69 Noticeably, the United States refused to sign the 
document.70 
1. Concerns about Geoengineering Technology 
From the point of view of geoengineering critics, there are two 
overarching concerns regarding climate change: (1) That it may 
present a moral hazard to invest in climate altering technology 
rather than focusing on initiatives to reduce emissions and (2) that 
there is a lack of oversight and international agreement on how to 
regulate geoengineering.71 
The moral hazard concern highlights the tensions between 
geoengineering research and deployment as well as the 
relationship between geoengineering and other methods of 
responding to climate change.72 Critics of geoengineering generally 
argue that the development of this technology “gives political 
leaders a false but enticing way to avoid confronting the carbon 
giants . . . and avoid addressing the root causes of climate chaos.”73 
Geoengineering endeavors could “undermine mainstream efforts 
to combat climate change.”74 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See e.g., Lin, supra note 54, at 677 (discussing the moral hazard concern); 
see also Watts, supra note 1 (highlighting the lack of governmental oversight and 
regulations for geoengineering technology). 
 72. See id. (“The moral hazard concern highlights relationships between 
geoengineering research and geoengineering deployment, and more broadly 
between geoengineering and other methods of responding to climate change.”). 
 73. Open Letter to SCoPEx Advisory Committee, GEOENGINEERING MONITOR 
(Aug. 21, 2019), http://www.geoengineeringmonitor.org/2019/08/open-letter-
scopex/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2021) [perma.cc/DK3B-XPB3]. 
 74. Lin, supra note 54, at 674. 
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Critics are also concerned about the lack of international 
agreement.75 The lack of international agreement could allow “an 
individual nation or even a private actor to undertake full-scale 
deployment of geoengineering unilaterally, potentially 
precipitating international conflict.”76 Efforts to internationally 
discuss and come to a resolution regarding geoengineering have 
been starkly opposed.77 United Nations member states have been 
reluctant to discuss or reach any consensus for economic or other 
reasons.78 As an example within the past year, member nations of 
the United Nations tried to discuss the importance of establishing 
an international, uniform policy towards geoengineering, or at 
least trying to discuss the dangers of geoengineering technology.79 
However, the United States and Saudi Arabia, “the world’s two 
biggest oil producers,” opposed plans to examine the risks of 
climate altering technology.80 
While the moral hazard and lack of international agreement 
may be troubling, there are compelling reasons why the United 
States, in particular, has chosen not to participate in international 
discussions about geoengineering technology. For the United 
States, climate-engineering technology has the potential to lessen 
the severity of the harms of climate change and allow for more 
gradual greenhouse gas controls, which would lessen the economic 
burden of imposing carbon reduction regulations.81 At this time, 
 
 75. See International Regulatory Framework for Geoengineering, ECOLOGIC 
(Aug. 2011), https://www.ecologic.eu/4168 (“There are no international rules or 
institutions specifically on geoengineering.”) [perma.cc/89S7-NTCC]. 
 76. Lin, supra note 54, at 677. 
 77. See Watts, supra note 1 (reporting that the initiative for the United 
Nations to discuss geoengineering “was block, initially by the US and Saudi 
Arabia, then by Japan and other countries”). 
 78. See id. (implying that the United States’ and Saudi Arabia’s opposition 
to discuss geoengineering is because of their economies’ dependence on oil). 
 79. See id. (“Deeper analysis of the risks had been proposed by Switzerland 
and 12 other countries as a first step towards stronger oversight of potentially 
world-altering experiments that would have implications for food supply, 
biodiversity, global inequality and security.”). 
 80. See id. (“But sources involved with the talks said the initiative was 
blocked, initially by the US and Saudi Arabia, then by Japan and other 
countries.”). 
 81. See Lee Lane, U.S. National Interest, Climate Engineering, and 
International Law, HUDSON INST. 1, 2 (2011) (“For the United States, having a 
viable CE option would confer two kinds of potential benefits. First, CE might 
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more information is needed to effectively govern geoengineering 
technology as it continues to develop.82 Geoengineering technology 
is in the relatively early stages of development, and the costs of 
climate engineering are not entirely predictable.83 Also, 
geoengineering technology has unknown risks, which makes it 
more difficult to predict the potential side effects of deploying 
climate-engineering technologies, and the cost of those effects.84 
The concerns about geoengineering are substantial and must 
be addressed; however, these concerns may be unnecessarily 
preemptive at this time.85 The technology that could have global 
effects is still in its very early stages.86 Instead, more needs to be 
done to incentivize and create innovation, so when the time comes 
for this technology to be deployed, the best technologies are 
available for governments and the public to consider.87 
III. Intellectual Property–Patents 
A. The Balance Between Encouraging Innovation and the Social 
Cost to the Public 
The fundamental purpose of intellectual property law, 
specifically patent law is, “to Promote the Progress of Science and 
 
avoid harm from climate change; second, CE might allow more gradual, and, 
hence, less costly, GHG controls and adaptation measures.”). 
 82. See id. at 4 (“In the face of such great uncertainty, rules must either be 
hopelessly vague, or risk distorting future research and policy choices.”). 
 83. See SCoPEx, supra note 1 (describing SCoPEx as an experiment and not 
a test as a test would “make sense late in the development of an engineering 
system”); Lane, supra note 81, at 2–3 (estimating the net economic benefits from 
climate engineering technology to exceed one trillion dollars). 
 84. See Lane, supra note 81, at 3 (“U.S. policy makers must weigh the risk 
that CE might trigger costly side effects.”). 
 85. See id. at 4–5 (explaining reasons why the United States may wish to 
preserve its freedom of action on climate engineering). 
 86. See id. (“Such means do not exist with regard to the early stages of 
developing and testing CE . . . .”). 
 87. See id. (“If the United States . . . someday, decides that it wishes to 
deploy [climate engineering], affairs would alter. Any state or states seeking to 
deploy CE, or even to test it at large scale, would have a motive for trying to 
reconcile all bona fide world powers to its actions.”). 
806 27 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 791 (2021) 
useful Arts.”88 “The principle objective of much of intellectual 
property law is the promotion of new and improved works—either 
technological or expressive.”89 To accomplish this objective, patent 
law is incentive based.90 A patent allows its owner to hold a 
monopoly for a limited duration.91 Yet, this comes at a cost.92 The 
promise that one will have twenty years to exclusively use and 
profit from patented invention, incentivizes individuals to invest 
in innovation and creation.93 “[F]ewer people will acquire the work 
than if it were distributed on a competitive basis, and they will pay 
more for access.”94 Additionally, this may result in a less efficient 
allocation of resources.95 
B. The Status of Geoengineering Patents Today 
Geoengineering technology is a growing industry that appears 
to be in its beginning phase.96 Prior to 2008, the combined number 
of patent applications and patents granted for geoengineering 
technologies did not exceed twenty in a single year.97 Between 2008 
 
 88. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 89. PETER S. MENELL, MARK A. LEMLEY, & ROBERT P. MERGES, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE:  2019, 16 (Clause 8 Publishing, ed. 
2019) (2019). 
 90. See id. at 16 (“Both the United States Constitution and judicial decisions 
emphasize incentive theory in justifying intellectual property.”). 
 91. See id. at 19 (describing how intellectual property rights give IP owners 
temporary monopolies). 
 92. See id. (describing intellectual property rights as imposing a social cost 
on the public). 
 93. See id. at 18 (“Instead, the government has created time-limited 
intellectual property rights over technological inventions and expressive 
creativity to encourage inventors and authors to invest in the development of new 
ideas and works of authorship.”). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 19. 
 96. See Fred Pearce, Geoengineer the Planet? More Scientists Now Say It 
Must Be an Option, YALEENVIRONMENT360 (May 29, 2019), 
https://e360.yale.edu/features/geoengineer-the-planet-more-scientists-now-say-
it-must-be-an-option (“A spate of dire scientific warnings that the world 
community can no longer delay major cuts in carbon emissions . . . has left a 
growing number of scientists saying that it’s time to give the controversial 
technologies a serious look.”) [perma.cc/K9YJ-SNY4]. 
 97. See Chavez, supra note 14, at 10 (“As the chart demonstrates, before 
2008, the combined number of patent applications and patents granted for 
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and 2013, the number of patent applications for geoengineering 
technology increased five-fold.98 
CDR methods have dominated this recent growth, constituting 
more than 90% of the geoengineering patents approved by the 
USPTO. Specifically, of the patents granted, more than half 
(54%) concern carbon capture, and more than one-third (37%) 
involve carbon sequestration. Particle-dispersion (4%) and 
solar-ray reflection (2%) patents commonly recur, with patents 
involving other various methods making up the difference 
(3%).99 
Between 2001 and 2010, the number of “exotic” 
geoengineering patent applications increased from two to 
thirty-one—a 1550% increase.100 Given the early stages of 
geoengineering technology and lack of established governance 
framework, intellectual property will likely have a profound 
impact on the development and use of this type of technology.101 
The private sector can and should play a vital role in 
geoengineering research, subsequent development, and possible 
implementation because the private sector is the primary source 
for research, development, production, and services.102 However, 
within the current scheme of geoengineering technology patents, 
there are emerging issues.103 Some issues extend to cover all 
 
geoengineering technologies did not exceed twenty in a single year.”). 
 98. See id. (describing the increase and rate of increase in patent 
applications for geoengineering technologies). 
 99. Id. at 10–11. 
 100. Shobita Parthasarathy, A Public Good? 5 (UNIV. OF MICH. GERALD R. 
FORD SCH. OF PUB. POL’Y, Working Paper No. STPP 10-1) http://jreynolds.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/03/Parthasarathy-2010-A-Public-Good.pdf (describing the 
recent rise in geoengineering patent applications) [perma.cc/9EJR-VCFJ]. 
 101. P. Oldham et al., Mapping the Landscape of Climate Engineering 2, 
ROYAL SOC’Y PUBL’G (Dec. 28, 2014), 
https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/pdf/10.1098/rsta.2014.0065 (“In the 
absence of an established governance framework, the practices of scientific 
research and intellectual property tend to shape the field and set trajectories for 
future development.”) [perma.cc/4TUE-SQN6]. 
 102. See Reynolds, supra note 13, at 2 (explaining that it is likely that the 
private sector will drive innovation in this field and highlighting that many times 
states do not take on the endeavor themselves but rely on the private sector for 
innovation). 
 103. See e.g., Parthasarathy, supra note 100, at 10 (describing the high risks 
of geoengineering technologies and how the current patent system cannot 
adequately address these characteristics); Chavez, supra note 14, at 9–17 
808 27 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 791 (2021) 
geoengineering patents, while others appear to apply only to 
specific areas of geoengineering, such as SRM and CDR 
technologies. 
The majority of geoengineering patents are assigned to the 
same patent holders, thus concentrating the potential for this 
technology in the hands of a few.104 Original patent holders tend to 
transfer their ownership to many of the same assignees, some of 
which are non-practicing entities.105 This could allow a few owners 
to dictate how the field of geoengineering develops.106 Scholars 
have cautioned against keeping the status quo and allowing the 
geoengineering industry to develop in the same manner as the 
biotechnology industry developed.107 One academic speaking on 
the topic stated: 
If we continue to deal with geoengineering patents as we did in 
biotechnology, we would create problems that are similar—or 
perhaps even worse—because of the high risk, high reward 
nature of the technology. The patent holders will control 
whether and how geoengineering technology will be researched 
and used.108 
In the biotechnology industry, the concentration of patent 
ownership among a few entities incentivized the limited grant of 
exclusive licenses, incentivized patent owners to charge incredibly 
high prices, and allowed these patent holders to dictate the 
development of the industry.109 
 
(warning that the development of geoengineering IP was resulting in 
anti-commons and patent thickets); Reynolds, supra note 13, at 3 (describing 
emerging issues with SRM technologies). 
 104. See Chavez, supra note 14, at 11 (“A review of these patents further 
reveals that many of these inventions are assigned to only a few patent holders.”). 
 105. See id. (“Consequently, the future development of these technologies is 
concentrated in the hands of a few.”); Parthasarathy, supra note 100, at 5 
(“Non-practicing entities . . . and commercial ventures, in particular, have filed 
applications for a number of variants on one technology, often resulting in one or 
a handful of innovators controlling a significant proportion of the patents in a 
particular method of geoengineering.”). 
 106. See Parthasarathy, supra note 100, at 6 (“While this may just be a result 
of the small number of applications to date, it could allow a relatively small 
number of owners to control innovation in a particular area of geoengineering.”). 
 107. See id. at 7–8 (describing the biotechnology industry as a cautionary 
tale). 
 108. Id. at 8. 
 109. See id. at 7–8 (using Myriad Genetics’ patents on the BRCA genes as an 
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The critiques of the development of the biotechnology industry 
parallel many of the global concerns about the distribution of not 
only geoengineering technology, but more broadly “green” 
technology.110 “Concerns over patent system and climate change 
have already caused serious political tensions.”111 Geographic 
imbalances in patenting behaviors and problems with the costs of 
technology acquisition for developing countries will “further 
exacerbate existing intellectual property trade, and scientific 
differences and [will] generate political tensions along the 
North-South divide.”112 
There are also specific problems tied to the development of 
CDR technologies.113 Many of these issues arise from the novelty 
of the field, lack of development of standardized technology, patent 
examiners’ lack of expertise in the new technology, and applicants’ 
desires to capture the largest possible grant of protection.114 In this 
area of geoengineering technology, extremely broad patents are 
being granted, and there appears to be a “land grab” taking 
place.115 A land grab “occurs when a lack in clarity of future 
technologies encourages speculators to seek patents in developing 
fields, which in turn causes actual inventors to file patent 
applications to avoid a competitive disadvantage.”116 An example 
of an extremely broad patent is Patent No. 8,603,424, 
“CO2-sequestering formed building materials,” which in its own 
 
example of this phenomena). 
 110. See Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Patent System and Climate Change, 16 VA. J. 
L. & TECH. 301, 320 (2011) (explaining the concerns about the patent system’s role 
in promoting climate change technology development and dissemination given 
the unbalanced nature of worldwide innovation, patenting, and ownership). 
 111. Id. at 306. 
 112. Id. at 320. 
 113. See Chavez, supra note 14, at 13–17 (describing how the current patent 
system exacerbates geoengineering patent-issues). 
 114. Id. at 14 (citing Amber Rose Stiles, Hacking Through the Thicket:  A 
Proposed Patent Pooling Solution to the Nanotechnology “Building Block” Patent 
Thicket Problem, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 555, 563 (2012)). 
 115. See id. at 13 (“Indeed, climate engineering appears to be undergoing a 
‘patent land-grab.’”). 
 116. Id.  
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language specifically rejects any limitations upon its terms.117 This 
patent is not set to expire until November 8, 2029.118 
There are three main reasons why a “land grab” and patents, 
such as No. 8,603,424, are troubling in this space.119 First, 
geoengineering is in its infancy; scientists have contemplated 
using technology to combat climate change for fewer than fifteen 
years.120 Second, many of the granted patents are overly broad and 
poorly defined.121 Early owners could own huge swaths of the field, 
thus “deter[ring] future innovation and bestow[ing] control over 
technology with potentially immeasurable societal value to only a 
few.”122 Third, granted geoengineering patents tend to be the 
“building-block patents,” on which later inventions must rely.123 
Building-block patents are distinct from “incremental 
improvement patents, which have a much narrower claim 
scope.”124 While building-block patents may not be very profitable, 
they can be crucial for downstream development.125 Conversely, too 
many building-block patents can “lock up technologies” and slow 
development. 126 “[T]hey allow patent holders to deny licenses, 
 
 117. See CO2-Sequestering Formed Building Materials, GOOGLE PATENTS, 
https://patents.google.com/patent/US8603424B2/en (last visited Feb. 19, 2020) 
(listing the basic information for Patent No. US 8,603,424) [perma.cc/8Z8Z-FC37]; 
see also Chavez, supra note 97, at 12 (using this patent as an example of an 
over-broad patent). 
 118. See CO2-Sequestering Formed Building Materials, supra note 117 
(listing the adjusted expiration as Nov. 8, 2029). 
 119. See Chavez, supra note 97, at 13–14 (explaining why a patent land-grab 
is particularly pernicious in this space). 
 120. See id. at 13 (“Scientists have contemplated climate engineering as a 
response to climate change for less than one decade.”). 
 121. See id. (describing the types of patents that have been issued for 
geoengineering technologies). 
 122. Id. at 14. 
 123. See id. at 13 (“Because of this [early in the development of the field], 
applications often seek building-block patents, which cover fundamental products 
and processes.”). 
 124. Id. at 14 (quoting John C. Miller & Drew L. Harris, The Carbon Nanotube 
Patent Landscape, 3 NANOTECH L. & BUS. 427, 435 (2006)). 
 125. See Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601, 
611–12 (2005) (“But largely because they were funded by the federal government 
before the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, they granted nonexclusive licenses to all 
comers, meaning that their patents raised the cost of practicing biotechnology but 
did not prevent anyone from entering the downstream market.”). 
 126. See Chavez, supra note 14, at 13 (“Awarding building-block patents, 
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charge exorbitant royalties, or engage in delaying tactics, most 
notably litigation.”127 The combination of inventors’ filing 
applications early on to avoid a competitive disadvantage and the 
lack of existing geoengineering research make the 
climate-engineering environment ripe for opportunistic 
exploitation.128 
The development of SRM technology has taken a slightly 
different course than CDR technology and appears to be 
proceeding in a publicly oriented manner.129 As of 2020, many of 
these solar geoengineering patent families have been abandoned 
and very few remain.130 In part, that is due to the unique nature of 
SRM technology.131 SRM technologies most likely will be 
transnational.132 Solar geoengineering research, development, and 
implementation would be public goods in the sense that they would 
provide nonexcludable and non-rivalrous benefits of expected 
lessened climate change.133 There also appears to be an emerging 
culture and practice among SRM researchers of sharing data 
freely, and there is little evidence that researchers are keeping the 
data to themselves or taking protective measures to maintain 
trade secrecy in the know-how.134 
 
especially early in an industry’s development, can frustrate the field’s growth.”). 
 127. Id. 
 128. See id. (“Coupled with the increasing number of patent applications for 
related technologies, the lack of geoengineering research makes the 
climate-engineering environment ripe for opportunistic exploitation.”). 
 129. See Reynolds, supra note 13, at 3 (describing the indications that solar 
geoengineering is proceeding in a publicly oriented manner). 
 130. See id. at 2 (“Of these [patents and patent application families], 13 had 
been abandoned, 5 had expired, and 17 were related to space- and surface-based 
techniques, which are generally regarded as prohibitively expensive, of limited 
capacity, and/or otherwise infeasible.”). 
 131. See id at 2–3 (detailing the unique characteristics of solar 
geoengineering). 
 132. See id. at 3 (“First, any implementation would inherently have 
transnational effects.”). 
 133. See id. at 2 (“After all, solar geoengineering research, development, and 
implementation would be public goods, not necessarily in a normative sense but 
in the economic sense of providing the nonexcludable and nonrivalrous benefits 
of expected lessened climate change.”). 
 134. See id. (explaining the present culture and practice among solar 
geoengineering researchers). 
812 27 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 791 (2021) 
Additionally, the market for SRM technology will be quite 
different.135 One author predicts that the field of SRM technology 
will become a monopsony (or oligopsony) procurement structure, 
like there is in the national defense and transportation 
industries.136 Monopsony and oligopsony are market conditions 
where there is only one buyer or a small number of buyers, 
respectively.137 Estimates predict that the direct financial cost of 
global solar geoengineering deployment will be approximately $25 
to $50 billion with additional annual spending in monitoring and 
related activities.138 There likely will be a substantial opportunity 
for private companies to profit from these technologies.139 
The two largest issues facing the development of SRM 
technology and intellectual property are:  (1) That any 
implementation would inherently have transnational effects, and 
(2) that it is difficult to distinguish purely SRM research and 
innovation from non-SRM research and innovation.140 SRM 
technology would have global effects.141 Given its global effects, 
collaboration and transfer of know-how will be essential for 
research and innovation in this field.142 Additionally, there are few 
patents that will strictly be “SRM” patents.143 Many of the 
 
 135. See id. at 3 (predicting the market structure for solar geoengineering 
technologies). 
 136. See id. (“We believe that large-scale research, development, and potential 
implementation of solar geoengineering are most likely to assume a monopsony 
(or oligopsony) procurement structure, as it has in the national defense and 
transportation sectors.”). 
 137. See Julie Young, Monopsony, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 3, 2020), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/monopsony.asp (defining monopsony and 
oligopsony) [perma.cc/9JU5-EYZ7]. 
 138. See Reynolds, supra note 13, at 3 (“Looking toward possible 
implementation, estimates of the direct financial cost of global solar 
geoengineering deployment are approximately US $25 to 50 billion annually.”). 
 139. See id. (“This implies that providing technology, materials, and services 
could be a moderately sized industry generating significant profits.”). 
 140. See id. (explaining the two challenges of solar geoengineering patents). 
 141. See id. (explaining how the transnational effects of climate change create 
an interesting dilemma where control to data access law remain within national 
jurisdictions yet governmental legislators and regulators are reluctant to tackle 
the issue). 
 142. See id. (“[B]ut we also expect research and innovation to be collaborative 
and to transfer know-how and technologies across borders.”). 
 143. See id. (explaining that there is not a clear line between non-SRM and 
strictly SRM technology). 
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components necessary for successful SRM technology will come 
from devices and technology successful in other industries.144 For 
example, the developers of inkjet printers are involved in research 
to create a nozzle to spray fine salt water mist without clogging 
that could be used for marine cloud brightening.145 Identifying 
“SRM” technology is difficult as many inventions will have 
dual-use, uses applicable in multiple fields.146 
C. Solutions That Have Already Been Provided 
In response to these emerging issues, multiple scholars have 
offered possible solutions and suggestions about how the patent 
system should adapt or change for geoengineering technology.147 
Several scholars have advocated for a separate entity within the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to review 
geoengineering patent applications more closely and with 
additional scrutiny.148 Others advocate for creating patent pools, 
and either additionally or as an alternative, create a research 
commons.149 Many have touched upon whether march-in rights or 
implementing compulsory licenses is another appropriate response 
to the developing system.150 However, due to the limited cases 
 
 144. See id. (“Likewise, inventions developed in contexts outside of solar 
geoengineering would have applications therein, and those that seem exclusive to 
solar geoengineering would have uses elsewhere.”). 
 145. See id. (providing an example of how developers of inkjet printers are 
involved in creating a nozzle that can spray an extremely fine mist of salt water 
without clogging). 
 146. See id. (“A second difficulty for IP and data access policies is that there 
is no clear line between, on the one hand, research and innovation within solar 
geoengineering and, on the other, activities outside of the field.”). 
 147. See Reynolds, supra note 13, at 5–6 (proposing four recommendations 
regarding IP for solar geoengineering); Parthasarathy, supra note 100, at 11–12 
(proposing four recommendations for geoengineering patent development); 
Chavez, supra note 97, at 31–35 (advocating for the United States to establish a 
patent pool). 
 148. See e.g., Parthasarathy, supra note 100, at 11–12 (proposing 
recommendations for a sui generis patent system). 
 149. See e.g., Chavez, supra note 14, at 31–35 (advising that the US develop 
unique procedures to approve these patent applications and form a 
geoengineering patent pool to facilitate innovation and accessibility). 
 150. See e.g., id. at 21–27 (discussing the viability of compulsory licensing for 
geoengineering patents); see also Reynolds, supra note 14, at 4 (dismissing 
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discussing march-in rights (none have been granted) and 
compulsory licenses, scholars have urged the government to clarify 
the conditions under which it would exercise march-in rights, 
compulsory licenses, or other mechanisms to grant licenses.151 
D. Different Mechanisms Through Which the United States 
Government Interferes in the Patent System to Grant Licenses 
1. The Bayh-Dole Act and Origin of March-In Rights 
The federal government plays a large role in the development 
of U.S. technologies in the private sector through financial 
assistance and funding.152 Yet, the aid of federal funding brings 
questions about who owns the rights to the invention once 
patented.153 What interest does the U.S. government retain when 
it plays a purely financial role in the development of the patented 
invention? 
In the 1960s, the Kennedy administration implemented the 
“Government Patent Policy.”154 Under the policy, the United States 
was the default owner of the rights to inventions developed 
through government contracts and government funding.155 Yet, 
there were specific circumstances where the contractor could 
 
march-in rights or compulsory licenses as a potential solution because only very 
rare circumstances trigger their use). 
 151. See e.g., Reynolds, supra note 13, at 6 (“The fourth and final proposal is 
for governments to clarify the conditions under which they would:  exercise 
march-in rights . . . .”). 
 152. See Oldham, supra note 101, at 7 (stating that the “climate engineering 
research funding is dominated by the US National Science Foundation (NSF), the 
UK Natural Environment Research Council (NERC), the European Commission, 
the US Department of Energy and NASA with the National Natural Science 
Foundation of China appearing seventh in the rankings.”). 
 153. See JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44597, MARCH-IN RIGHTS 
UNDER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT, 1, 5–6 (2016) (discussing the history of how the 
federal government considered the implications of public funding in intellectual 
property research and development). 
 154. See id. at 5 (explaining the early beginnings of granting rights for 
intellectual property made with public funding to government contractors). 
 155. See id. (“This early ‘Government Patent Policy’ generally allowed the 
U.S. government to retain rights to inventions developed through government 
contracts.”). 
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obtain title to the patent.156 If a contractor obtained title, the 
patent was still “subject to the government acquiring at least an 
irrevocable non-exclusive royalty free license throughout the world 
for governmental purposes.”157 Further, the 1963 policy contained 
an additional policy, which became the prelude to today’s march-in 
rights: 
Where the principal or exclusive (except as against the 
government) rights to an invention are acquired by the 
contractor, the government shall have the right to require the 
granting of a license to an applicant royalty free or on terms 
that are reasonable in the circumstances to the extent that the 
invention is required for public use by governmental 
regulations or as may be necessary to fulfill health needs, or for 
other public purposes stipulated in the contract.158 
However, Congress became increasingly concerned that the 
United States was falling behind the pace of technological 
advancement.159 Congress accepted the proposition that, “the lack 
of patent title discouraged private enterprise from advancing 
early-stage technologies into the marketplace.”160 In 1980, 
Congress enacted the Bayh-Dole Act, which allowed non-profits, 
universities, and small businesses to elect to retain title to any 
invention that was made under federally funded research and 
development.161 In February 1983, through an executive order, 
President Reagan extended the Bayh-Dole Act to apply to all 
parties that contract with the United States, regardless of their 
 
 156. See id. (“However, the contractor could obtain title in specified 
circumstances.”). 
 157. Statement of Government Patent Policy, 28 Fed. Reg. 10943, 10945 (Oct. 
10, 1963). 
 158. See Thomas, supra note 153, at 5 (quoting Statement of Government 
Patent Policy, 28 Fed. Reg. 10943, 10945 (Oct. 10, 1963)). 
 159. See Titus Galama & James Hosek, Is the United States Losing Its Edge 
in Science and Technology?, RAND CORP. (2008), 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_briefs/2008/RAND_RB93
47.pdf (“In the mid-2000s, numerous public and private sector reports argued that 
the United States is falling behind, and Capitol Hill responded with a wave of 
policy initiatives.”) [perma.cc/5P6G-K8DG]. 
 160. Thomas, supra note 153, at 5. 
 161. See id. at 6 (“Under the Bayh-Dole Act, each nonprofit organization 
(including universities) or small business is permitted to elect within a reasonable 
time to retain title to any ‘subject invention’ made under federally funded R&D.”).  
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size.162 The executive order has been upheld and maintained since 
it went into place.163 
While the Bayh-Dole Act gave contractors the rights to 
inventions, the act also provided that the United States 
government had march-in rights.164 “March-in rights allow the 
government, in specified circumstances, to require the contractor 
or successors in title to the patent to grant a ‘nonexclusive, 
partially exclusive, or exclusive license’ to a ‘responsible applicant 
or applicants.’”165 In essence, the government could “march in” and 
grant licenses for patents that were the product of publicly funded 
research and development.166 If the patent owner refused to grant 
a license, the government can grant the license itself.167 Exercising 
march-in rights does not invalidate the patent; rather, it grants 
permission for an enterprise, identified by the government, to 
practice the patented invention.168 To invoke march-in rights, one 
of four circumstances must be met: 
(1) action is necessary because the contractor or assignee has 
not taken, or is not expected to take within a reasonable time, 
effective steps to achieve practical application of the subject 
invention in such field of use; 
(2) action is necessary to alleviate health or safety needs which 
are not reasonably satisfied by the contractor, assignee, or their 
licensees; 
(3) action is necessary to meet requirements for public use 
specified by Federal regulations and such requirements are not 
reasonably satisfied by the contractor, assignee, or licensees; or 
(4) action is necessary because the agreement required by 
 
 162. See id. (“[T]hen-President Ronald Reagan ordered all agencies to treat, 
as allowable by law, all contractors within the Bayh-Dole Act framework 
regardless of their size.”). 
 163. Id. 
 164. See id. at 7 (explaining the mechanics of march-in rights under the 
Bayh-Dole Act). 
 165. Id. 
 166. See id. (“The Bayh-Dole Act provides the government with the ability to 
‘march in’ and grant licenses for patents that resulted from publicly funded 
R&D.”). 
 167. See id. (“If the patent owner refuses to do so, the government may grant 
the license itself.”). 
 168. See id. (explaining how march-in rights affects the patent and assignee’s 
rights). 
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section 204 [generally requiring that patented products be 
manufactured substantially in the United States unless 
domestic manufacture is not commercially feasible] has not 
been obtained or waived or because a license of the exclusive 
right to use or sell any subject invention in the United States is 
in breach of its agreement obtained pursuant to section 204. 169 
“Practical application” under subsection one is further defined as,  
[T]o manufacture in the case of a composition or product, to 
practice in the case of a process or method, or to operate in the 
case of a machine or system; and, in each case, under such 
conditions as to establish that the invention is being utilized 
and that its benefits are to the extent permitted by law or 
Government regulations available to the public on reasonable 
terms.170 
Following enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act, however, march-in 
rights have not been exercised.171 The National Institute of Health 
(NIH) has received six petitions for the NIH to “‘march in’ with 
respect to a particular pharmaceutical.”172 Yet, each petition has 
been denied.173 Petitioners filed for march-in rights for several 
reasons mainly focusing on the drug’s price.174 NIH has declined to 
exercise march-in rights for high drug prices, because this type of 
scenario does not fit into any of the four statutory provisions175 and 
 
 169. 35 U.S.C. § 203(a). 
 170. Thomas, supra note 153, at 7 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 201(f)). 
 171. See id. at 8 (“March-in rights have never been exercised during the 
35-year history of the Bayh-Dole Act.”). 
 172. Id. 
 173. See Policies and Reports, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH OFF. OF INTRAMURAL 
RSCH. & OFF. OF TECH. TRANSFER, https://www.ott.nih.gov/policy/policies-reports 
(listing the National Institute of Health’s march-in responses) [perma.cc/Q9GC-
ZXW2]; see also Thomas, supra note 153, at 8 (“Each petition was denied.”). 
 174. See e.g., NIH Decision on Xtandi March-In Request, DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUM. SERVS., NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH (June 7, 2016 & June 20, 2016), 
https://www.ott.nih.gov/sites/default/files/documents/policy/pdfs/Final_Response
_Goldman_6.20.2016.pdf (responding to concerns that the price of Xtandi® is too 
high) [perma.cc/25KE-57RZ]; see also March-In Position Paper in the Case of 
Xalatan, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH (Sept. 17, 2004), 
https://www.ott.nih.gov/sites/default/files/documents/policy/March-in-
xalatan.pdf (responding to concerns that the price of Xalatan® is too high) 
[perma.cc/N8AB-Z3YY]. 
 175. See March-In Determination in the Case of Norvir (November 2013), 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH (Nov. 1, 2013), 
https://www.ott.nih.gov/sites/default/files/documents/policy/March-In-
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discrepancies between drug prices in the United States and other 
countries are “appropriately left for Congress to address 
legislatively.”176 
The requests to initiate march-in rights to combat rising drug 
prices and the government’s lack of action to exercise of march-in 
rights has led to a renewed debate about the pros and cons of 
march-in rights.177 Some proponents of march-in rights in this 
context believe that “U.S. taxpayers should be protected from what 
they view as excessive profiteering on technologies developed with 
public funding.”178 Other proponents assert that the Bayh-Dole Act 
“has had a powerful price-control clause since its enactment in 
1980 that mandates that inventions resulting from federally 
funded research must be sold at reasonable prices.”179 Therefore, 
the solution to high drug prices can be solved within the Act as it 
is already written, through the unused, unenforced march-in 
provision of the Act.180 
The proponents’ argument rests on the “reasonable terms” 
within the definition of “practical application.”181 Several courts, 
including the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Sixth Circuits 
and district courts have interpreted “reasonable terms” in similar 
contexts to include price.182 “The terms required by the Bayh-Dole 
 
Norvir2013.pdf (addressing each of petitioners’ claims in light of the statute’s 
text) [perma.cc/2PM7-F24T]. 
 176. March-In Position Paper in the Case of Xalatan, supra note 174, at 6. 
 177. See e.g., Joseph Allen, ‘The Washington Post’ Misses the Mark on 
March-In Rights, IP WATCHDOG (Apr. 22, 2019), 
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/04/22/washington-post-misses-mark-march-
rights/id=108499/ (explaining why under the Bayh-Dole Act the NIH was correct 
in denying petitioners’ requests for the federal government to march-in due to 
high drug prices) [perma.cc/B5LD-LP2R]. 
 178. Thomas, supra note 153, at 1–2. 
 179. Peter S. Arno & Michael H. Davis, Why Don’t We Enforce Existing Drug 
Price Controls? The Unrecognized and Unenforced Reasonable Pricing 
Requirements Imposed Upon Patents Deriving in Whole or in Part from Federally 
Funded Research, 75 TUL. L. REV. 631, 631 (2001). 
 180. See id. (concluding that “the solution to high drug prices does not involve 
new legislation but already exists in the unused, unenforced march-in provision 
of the Bayh-Dole Act”). 
 181. See id. at 649 (explaining the importance of the phrase “available to the 
public on reasonable terms” within 35 U.S.C. § 201(f) (1994)). 
 182. See id. at 650 (explaining the courts’ history of interpreting the phrase 
“reasonable terms”). 
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Act include, but are not limited to, reasonable prices.”183 A price is 
unreasonable if the unit price is “too high or if its use over the long 
term makes it too costly with respect to the investment, costs, and 
profits of the manufacturer.”184 “The requirement for ‘practical 
application’ seems clearly to authorize the federal government to 
review the prices of drugs developed with public funding under 
Bayh-Dole terms and to mandate march-in when prices exceed a 
reasonable level.”185 
Opponents of using march-in rights to combat rising drug 
prices include the two primary sponsors of the law.186 Senators 
Birch Bayh and Robert Dole responded with an editorial in the 
Washington Post, which plainly stated, “Bayh-Dole did not intent 
that government set prices on resulting products . . . . The law 
instructs the government to revoke such licenses only when the 
private industry collaborator has not successfully commercialized 
the invention as the product.”187 Additionally, Norman Latker, the 
former NIH patent counsel, and Howard Bremer, with the 
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, sent statements to NIH 
opposing the proposed misuse of march-in rights as “contrary to 
the law.”188 
In their statements, opponents of granting march-in rights in 
this context also highlighted the benefits of the current, unaltered 
scheme.189 Their statements explained that the Act has created 
new companies, new jobs, and contributes enormously to the U.S. 
economy.190 Companies that have developed some of the most 
 
 183. Id. at 651. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. See Allen, supra note 177 (quoting Senator Bayh and stating that 
Senators Bayh and Dole reject the argument that under the Act the federal 
government can use march-in rights to combat rising drug prices). 
 187. Birch Bayh and Robert Dole, Our Law Helps Patients Get New Drugs 
Sooner, WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2002) at A28. 
 188. Allen, supra note 177. 
 189. See generally NIH Public Meeting on Norvi/Ritonavir March-in Request, 
NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (May 25, 2004), 
https://www.ott.nih.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2004NorvirMtg/2004Norvir
Mtg.pdf (compiling the statements of those who opposed granting march-in 
rights) [perma.cc/Y3UB-LGAX]. 
 190. See id. at 5 (“The Economist estimated that Bayh-Dole created 2,000 new 
companies, 260,000 new jobs, and now contributes $40 billion annually to the U.S. 
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valuable drugs for curing human diseases were created because of 
the funding boost the federal government provided.191 Further, a 
change in march-in policy could undermine the ability of 
universities to make their federally funded technologies available 
for public benefit and the incentive for the private sector to invest 
in federally funded discoveries.192 While this debate was centered 
around rising drug prices, the debate illustrates the underlying 
tension and concerns about invoking march-in rights, and 
therefore their limited applicability and use. 
2. US Government’s Eminent Domain–Like Power Under 28 
U.S.C. § 1498 
Another mechanism that can be used by the United States 
government to grant licenses to U.S. patents is through 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1498.193 Section 1498 of the United States Code provides the 
United States government and its contractors with the ability to 
use or manufacture an invention described in and covered by a 
United States patent.194 The patent owner’s remedy is to bring an 
action against the United States in the US Court of Federal Claims 
“for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation for 
such use and manufacture.”195 The patent owner may not enjoin 
the United States from using their invention.196  
Section 1498(a) of the United States Code operates separately 
from the Bayh-Dole Act, and there are three significant 
distinctions from march-in rights.197 First, unlike march-in rights, 
 
economy.”). 
 191. See id. at 30 (“The award of the NCDDG-AIDS grant gave the HIV 
project a much-needed funding boost. In my opinion, it catalyzed the development 
of the antiviral program.”). 
 192. See id. at 36 (“The ability of universities to make their federally funded 
technologies available for public benefit would be undermined, and the incentive 
for the private sector to invest in federally funded discoveries would be 
removed.”). 
 193. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2018) (discussing licenses with patents). 
 194. Id. § 1498(a). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. § 1498. 
 197. See Thomas, supra note 153, at 8 (“Three significant distinctions exist 
between march-in rights under the Bayh-Dole Act and 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a).”). 
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the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1498 is not limited to only patented 
inventions that were developed with the support of federal funds; 
the provision applies to every U.S. patent.198 Second, the provision 
applies when the federal government or its contractors practice the 
patented invention, whereas with march-in rights, private 
enterprises may initiate requesting march-in rights from the 
government.199 Third, the scheme for compensation is different.200 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) the patent owner, “commences litigation 
and may be awarded damages to compensate for the use of the 
government or its contractors.”201 Whereas under the Bayh-Dole 
Act, recipients of march-in rights are awarded licenses and 
presumably pay royalties to the owner of the patent.202 
3. Compulsory Licensing 
A third mechanism the U.S. government may use to interfere 
with the United States patent system is to grant compulsory 
licenses.203 Compulsory licensing provides that the government 
has the ability to require that an owner of a patent license the use 
of their rights.204 In the United States, unlike many other 
countries, there is not a general compulsory licensing scheme.205 
Rather, Congress in a few circumstances has created limited 
compulsory licensing statutes, such as the Atomic Energy Act of 
 
 198. See id. (contrasting march-in rights and 28 U.S.C. § 1498). 
 199. See id. (contrasting march-in rights and 28 U.S.C. § 1498). 
 200. See id. (contrasting march-in rights and 28 U.S.C. § 1498). 
 201. Id. 
 202. See id. (contrasting march-in rights and 28 U.S.C. § 1498). 
 203. See Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals and TRIPS, WORLD TRADE 
ORG. (Mar. 2018), 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_faq_e.htm 
(“Compulsory licensing is when a government allows someone else to produce a 
patented product or process without the consent of the patent owner . . . .”) 
[perma.cc/4ZV6-PSHT]. 
 204. See id. (explaining compulsory licensing). 
 205. See Mark W. Lauroesch, General Compulsory Patent Licensing in the 
United States:  Good in Theory, but not Necessary in Practice, 6 SANTA CLARA HIGH 
TECH. L. J. 41, 41 (1990) (“Unlike a number of foreign countries, no ‘general’ 
compulsory licensing statute, applicable to all patents that have not been 
practiced or have been used for anticompetitive purposes, exists in this country 
[the United States].”). 
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1954 and the Clean Air Act of 1970.206 Although there is not a 
general compulsory licensing scheme in the United States, the 
Constitution permits limited compulsory licensing statutes as well 
as a potential general licensing statute.207 
Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution is the primary 
source of Congress’ authority to enact laws concerning patents and 
intellectual property broadly.208 Some authors have expressed that 
the term “exclusive rights” within clause 8 prevents the 
government from constitutionally granting a nonexclusive patent, 
which would be the result with compulsory licensing.209 
Additionally, some authors argue the government’s power to take 
patents is limited to takings for the public benefit and that 
“compulsory licensing results in the confiscation of private 
property only for the benefit of a private citizen, the licensee.”210 
However, both of these arguments fail. The purpose of 
compulsory licensing would be for the public’s benefit.211 
Compulsory licensing is used to, “ensure that the public receives 
the benefit of an innovation as soon as possible rather than only 
after [twenty] years.”212 Additionally, the term “exclusive rights” 
should not be interpreted as establishing the only rights that 
Congress can grant, but to indicate that “exclusive rights” was the 
maximum that Congress could grant.213 Further, in Sony 
Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,214 the 
 
 206. See id. at 46 (“Provisions permitting compulsory licenses have been 
included in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the Plant Variety Protection Act, the 
Clean Air Act of 1970, and the Copyright Act of 1976.”).  
 207. See id. at 44–47 (explaining why the U.S. Constitution would permit a 
general compulsory licensing statute). 
 208. See id. at 44 (stating the source of Congress’ power to enact patent laws). 
 209. See id. (explaining some of the constitutional arguments against 
compulsory licensing). 
 210. Id. at 44–45. 
 211. See id. at 45 (“The granting of a general compulsory license under a 
working requirement would, however, be in the public interest.”). 
 212. Id. 
 213. See id. (“Moreover, the word ‘exclusive’ in clause 8 should not be 
interpreted as establishing the only type of intellectual property right that 
Congress may grant, but instead only as emphasizing the greatest extent of the 
rights it may grant.”).  
 214. Sony Corp. of Am. V. Univ. Cty. Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) 
(holding that Sony’s sale of video tape recorders to the general public does not 
constitute contributory infringement of copyrights). 
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Supreme Court stated that, “[a]s the text of the Constitution 
makes plain, it is Congress that has been assigned the task of 
defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted 
to authors or to inventors in order to give the public appropriate 
access to their work product.”215 Therefore, Congress has the 
flexibility to determine the balance and incentives to disclose 
inventions, encourage innovation, and ensure that patents are 
practiced for the public’s benefit.216 
Opponents of compulsory licensing also tend to highlight that 
“those who believe they are attacking the abuses of the [patent] 
system may inadvertently damage the patent system itself.”217 
Compulsory licensing could destroy research incentives, which is 
an integral component of the patent system.218 This could occur if 
the royalties provided for under a compulsory licensing scheme are 
not comparable to royalties that would be received under a 
voluntary licensing scheme.219 The royalties under a compulsory 
licensing scheme may not allow the patent holder to fully recoup 
research and development costs.220 Inventors and companies may 
be less willing to invest time and money in research and 
development, if there is a possibility that they will not be able to 
reap the financial benefits of a patented technology.221 
 
 215. Id. at 429. 
 216. See Lauroesch, supra note 205, at 45 (concluding that “the framers’ 
intent has been interpreted not merely to ensure disclosure of inventions, but also 
to encourage innovation so that society can enjoy and benefit from the disclosure 
of inventions”). 
 217. Id. at 53 (quoting Fortas, The Patent System in Distress, 53 J. PAT. OFF. 
SOC’Y 810, 820 (1971)). 
 218. See id. (“Similarly, opponents of compulsory licensing argue that such 
licensing provisions would destroy the research incentive that is so integral to the 
patent system.”). 
 219. See id. (“This position would appear to be most valid if the royalties 
granted under a compulsory licensing system were not comparable to those that 
would be obtained under voluntary licensing.”).  
 220. See id. (explaining that an investor or inventor devotes time and money 
not only to patentable inventions but also all the prior unsuccessful experiments 
and inventions that came before it).  
 221. See id. (explaining that an investor or inventor is motivated in part to 
devote their time and money because of the expectation that they are going to 
recoup their investment or make more of a profit). 
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Further, the notion of implementing compulsory licenses 
within the United States patent system is generally disfavored.222 
Because of this hesitancy to use the compulsory licensing 
provisions within specific statutes, such as the Clean Air and 
Atomic Energy Acts, the courts have expressed resistance to 
awarding compulsory licenses.223 The Supreme Court has stated, 
“Compulsory licensing is a rarity in our patent system,”224 and it is 
typically considered a last resort.225 
However, despite the potential problems of compulsory 
licensing there can be significant benefits.226 Advocates for a 
general compulsory licensing scheme have highlighted four main 
potential benefits.227 “[G]eneral compulsory licensing could help 
put unused or unmarketed patented products in the consumers’ 
hands when patentees have not made efforts to practice their 
inventions.”228 Also, compulsory licensing could combat patent 
suppression.229 Patent suppression occurs when other patent 
holders have no intention to practice or license an improvement 
patent, but they use their patent simply to block competitors.230 
Further, compulsory licensing could also reduce wasted energy on 
“invent around” products, which consume significant amounts of 
time and effort to create imitation products that circumvent the 
 
 222. See Chavez, supra note 14, at 22 (“Yet, the U.S. patent system generally 
disfavors compulsory licensing.”).  
 223. See id. (explaining that only on a few occasions has the court imposed 
compulsory licensing).  
 224. Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980). 
 225. See Chavez, supra note 14, at 22 (“And although courts recognize 
compulsory licensing as a solution for antitrust violations, it is considered a 
remedy of last resort.”).  
 226. See Laureosch, supra note 205, at 42 (“Although some people support 
compulsory licensing purely out of distaste for the patent system, there appears 
to be a number of positive effects that could potentially result from compulsory 
licensing.”). 
 227. See id. at 42–44 (describing four benefits of a general compulsory 
licensing scheme). 
 228. Id. at 42. 
 229. See id. at 43 (“A second potential benefit of compulsory licensing is it 
might combat patent suppression.”). 
 230. See id. (explaining the detriment patent suppression can have on 
consumers). 
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actual patent.231 Lastly, compulsory licensing “could be used as a 
remedy for patent misuse and antitrust violations.”232 
IV. Proposing a Solution to Geoengineering Patenting Issues 
The complexities and early-stage development of 
geoengineering technologies warrant the creation and use of a 
specialized compulsory licensing scheme.233 There is a growing and 
immediate need for technologies that can help mitigate and slow 
the effects of climate change.234 Without the use of CDR and SRM 
technologies, it is almost certain that human and wildlife 
populations will be affected, and that poorer and marginalized 
communities will be disproportionately affected.235 
Additionally, geoengineering technologies that will be 
deployed, need to be high quality and thoroughly tested.236 
Geoengineering technologies, particularly solar-radiation 
management technologies, will have transnational effects.237 
Geoengineering technologies are “high risk technologies with the 
potential for a high reward; their impacts, positive and negative, 
are global in scope and if [the technology] does damage, it is likely 
to be irreversible.”238 Also, predictions about the effects of 
geoengineering technology are based, in large part, on computer 
 
 231. See id. (explaining that “[s]ignificant amounts of time and efforts are 
expended to create imitation products by inventing around patents”). 
 232. Id. at 44. 
 233. See supra Part III.D. 3. Compulsory Licensing (discussing compulsory 
licensing). 
 234. See e.g., Pearce, supra note 41 (warning that the globe may have 
surpassed a threshold for a cascade of inter-related tipping points); see also 
HUNTER, supra note 42 (explaining that the rise in global temperatures affects 
remaining carbon sinks and diminishes their ability to absorb carbon dioxide 
further exacerbating the effects of climate change). 
 235. See OLSSON, supra note 22, at 802 (explaining that because people who 
are poor and marginalized usually have the least buffer to face modest climate 
hazards they tend to suffer most). 
 236. See Parthasarathy, supra note 100, at 10 (describing the high risks of 
geoengineering technologies). 
 237. See Reynolds, supra note 13, at 3 (describing SRM technology as 
transnational and providing a public good). 
 238. Parthasarathy, supra note 100, at 10. 
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modeling.239 Computer modeling is only as good as the data that is 
put into the system.240 The input of multiple inventors and 
research groups will be required to adequately assess the benefits 
and problems with certain geoengineering technologies.241 
Further, there is a risk that allowing one patent holder of a 
broad, foundational patent could allow that patent rights holder to 
single handedly control the development of that technology.242 
Without multiple parties working to invent better technologies, a 
monopoly of the industry, or a particular swath of that industry, 
for twenty years could result in sub-par technology.243 Competition 
in an industry promotes innovation, and given the transnational 
effects of geoengineering inventions, patent holders and countries 
should be exercising the utmost caution with deploying technology 
that may not be the best equipped or most advanced.244 
A. Determining Which U.S. Government Action Would Best 
Promote Innovation Given the Unique Features of Geoengineering 
Technology 
The purpose of involving the United States federal 
government in this space would be to ensure that owners of broad, 
building block patents license these patents to other parties that 
can work towards creating improvement patents.245 Based on the 
 
 239. See SCoPEx, supra note 1 (stating that one of the purposes of the SCoPEx 
project is “to improve the fidelity of simulations (computer models)”). 
 240. See id. (“Analyzing these experiments will improve our knowledge 
beyond what is currently available within computer models is measurable with 
confidence under laboratory conditions.”). 
 241. See id. (explaining the benefit of inputting updated and real data into 
computer modeling programs). 
 242. See Chavez, supra note 14, at 13 (“This is normally a cause of concern 
because of the immense control patent holders have over future inventions.”). 
 243. See Parthasarathy, supra note 102, at 7–8 (discussing how the lack of a 
robust research environment in the space of genetic tests led to less accurate and 
most expensive methods for gene testing such as in the case for the BRCA genes). 
 244. See Reynolds, supra note 13, at 3 (stressing the global effect of climate 
engineering technologies); see also Parthasarathy, supra note 100, at 10 
(describing the high risks of geoengineering technologies). 
 245. See Chavez, supra note 14, at 14 (explaining how building blocks, while 
not always possessing any marketable value on their own, can be crucial to 
downstream development and the ability to create “incremental improvement 
patents”). 
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three mechanisms that the United States government may employ 
when interfering in the patent system, it appears that creating a 
specialized compulsory licensing scheme is most appropriate.246  
The Bayh-Dole Act provides that the government can compel 
patent rights holders that received federal funding to grant 
licenses to the government to use their technology or to entities 
which the government deems best to use to use the patented 
technology.247 There is evidence that many CDR and SRM 
technologies are invented with the aid of federal funding.248 
However, march-in rights have never been exercised.249 And, the 
specific requirements that must be met in order for the government 
to exercise the march-in rights provision have been narrowly 
construed making it even more difficult to satisfy these 
requirements .250 
Perhaps, the government could exercise march-in rights under 
the Bayh-Dole Act’s third provision, which permits the government 
to exercise march-in rights when it “is necessary to meet 
requirements for public use by Federal regulations . . . .”251 But, as 
of February 2020, there are no regulations defining what “public 
use” would look like in this context.252 Further, even if “public use” 
could be defined in this context, march-in rights would only be 
applicable to inventions that used federal funding in their research 
 
 246. See supra Part II.D (describing the three mechanisms through which the 
federal government can interfere with the patent system to license patented 
inventions). 
 247. See Thomas, supra note 153, at 7 (explaining that the Bayh-Dole Act 
preserves the United States’ ability to “march-in”). 
 248. See Oldham, supra note 101, at 7–8 (listing the U.S. National Science 
Foundation, U.S. Department of Energy, and NASA among the entities that are 
dominating climate engineering research funding). 
 249. See Thomas, supra note 153, at 1 (“Members of Congress have recently 
taken note of the fact that march-in rights have never been exercised during the 
35-year history of the Bayh-Dole Act.”). 
 250. See id. at 7–10 (stating the four scenarios where march-in rights can be 
used and describing the six failed petitions to institute march-in rights). 
 251. 35 U.S.C. § 203(a). 
 252. See James Temple, Geoengineering is very controversial. How can you do 
experiments? Harvard has some ideas., MIT TECH. REV. (July 29, 2019), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/614025/geoengineering-experiment-
harvard-creates-governance-committee-climate-change/ (highlighting that there 
is not a US-government-funded research program in this area, or any public 
oversight body set up to weigh the particularly complex questions surrounding 
solar geoengineering) [perma.cc/P8Q9-WLT9]. 
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and development.253 Using march-in rights could allow private 
entities to escape the possibility of mandatory licensing.254 Broad, 
foundational patents invented without the use of federal funding 
would still be able to take up large swaths of the geoengineering 
field and prevent other inventors from building off of that 
foundational patent to create incremental, “improvement” 
patents.255 
The government’s exercise of its eminent domain-like power 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 would also be inadequate to fully address 
the issues developing within the geoengineering patent space.256 
Under Section 1498(a) of the U.S. Code, the federal government 
has the ability to condemn any patent; however, the government 
may only then allow the government or one of its contractors to 
practice the invention.257 In the geoengineering space, the private 
sector, without direct affiliation with the federal government, can 
and should play a crucial role in the development of CDR and SRM 
technologies.258 Limiting the potential licensees of this technology 
to only the government and governmental contractors would not 
solve the underlying issues within the geoengineering technology 
space. 
A specific compulsory licensing scheme, as was created with 
the Atomic Energy and Clean Air Acts, would be the best option 
 
 253. See Thomas, supra note 153, at 7 (“The Bayh-Dole Act provides the 
government with the ability to ‘march-in’ and grant licenses for patents that 
resulted from publicly funded R&D.”). 
 254. See id. (stating that the Bayh-Dole Act only applies to inventions that 
received some federal funding). 
 255. See Chavez, supra note 14, at 14 (explaining the implications of awarding 
building-blocks early in an industry’s development). 
 256. See Thomas, supra note 153, at 8 (listing the similarities and differences 
between march-in rights and 28 U.S.C. § 1498). 
 257. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (“[T]he use or manufacture of an invention 
described in and covered by a patent of the United States by a contractor, a 
subcontractor, or any person, firm, or corporation for the Government . . . shall be 
construed as use or manufacture for the United States.”). 
 258. See Reynolds, supra note 13, at 2 
Furthermore, the private sector arguably should play a role in solar 
geoengineering research and any subsequent development and 
possible implementation, as the private sector is the primary source of 
valuable innovations in many devices, materials, techniques, and 
services that might be necessary or useful for any development and 
implementation of solar geoengineering. 
PAST THE TIPPING POINT 829 
for addressing the concerns with SRM and CDR technologies.259 
Like the Atomic Energy Act, a compulsory licensing scheme for 
geoengineering technology could address concerns about the 
national and international implications of this technology while 
also promoting development within the industry.260 For countries 
that have compulsory licensing provisions in other fields, the 
benefits of having these provisions is not implementing the 
scheme, but rather using the scheme as a threat.261 The threat of 
implementing the compulsory licensing scheme can coerce patent 
holders to grant licenses to third parties, and perhaps on terms 
that may be more favorable to the patent holders than if the 
compulsory licensing scheme were implemented.262 
Additionally, there is evidence that the industry is already 
taking steps on its own to fix the emerging technology issues.263 By 
providing a clear mechanism through which patent holders 
understand when they would be compelled to license their patents, 
a specific compulsory licensing scheme could serve as further 
encouragement to ensure that the industry develops in a manner 
that does not lock up technologies.264 
 
 259. See 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (2018) (discussing the way that atomic energy can 
“contribute to the general welfare”). 
 260. See Parthasarathy, supra note 102, at 9 (“It [Congress] created these 
rules as part of the Atomic Energy Act in order to address concerns about national 
security implications of atomic energy development while still promoting 
development in this industry.”). 
 261. See Chavez, supra note 97, at 26 (describing the prevalence of 
compulsory licensing schemes in international agreements and laws and that in 
practice, countries rarely implement the schemes). 
 262. See id. (“More commonly, governments threaten to utilize their licenses, 
thus coercing patent holders to either grant licenses or make the product 
available at substantially lower prices.”). 
 263. See e.g., David Keith & John Dykema, Why We Chose Not to Patent Solar 
Geoengineering Technologies, THE KEITH GRP. (May 3, 2018), 
https://keith.seas.harvard.edu/blog/why-we-chose-not-patent-solar-
geoengineering-technologies (advocating that inventors and organizations should 
not patent SRM technology) [perma.cc/9MSS-LDCx]; see also Reynolds, supra 
note 13, at 2 (“[W]e also found that there presently is a culture and practice among 
solar geoengineering researchers of sharing data freely, and little evidence that 
these researchers kept data or know how to themselves or took protective 
measures to maintain trade secrecy in the data and know-how.”). 
 264. See Thomas, supra note 153, at 10–12 (describing the on-going debate 
and uncertainty as to when march-in rights should be exercised); see also Chavez, 
supra note 14, at 27 (“Compulsory licenses certainly could help address the 
problems developing with geoengineering patents.”). 
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B. Defining the Scope of a Geoengineering Compulsory Licensing 
Scheme 
While some authors advocate for the federal government to 
compel licensing or exercise march-in rights to all green 
technology, there are significant benefits to limiting the scope of 
technologies susceptible to a compulsory licensing scheme to only 
geoengineering technologies.265 Opponents of compulsory licensing 
in general, highlight that compulsory licensing could deter and 
stifle innovation.266 Therefore, limiting a compulsory licensing 
scheme to only geoengineering technologies balances the concerns 
of granting compulsory licensing generally with the concerns about 
the unique, transnational, and high-risk nature of this technology. 
Unlike atomic energy, there is a wide breadth of 
geoengineering technologies with few common and easily definable 
characteristics.267 Yet, the Atomic Energy Act’s definition of 
technology susceptible to the act as, “to the extent that an 
invention is useful in atomic energy” provides useful guidance.268 
Patents and technologies subject to a potential compulsory scheme 
should be limited to the extent that a technology is useful in 
significantly altering the climate through climate engineering.269 
Within CDR technologies, this would include ocean fertilization 
and direct air capture; however, it would exclude the development 
of more fuel-efficient car engines.270 Within SRM technologies, this 
 
 265. See e.g., Teneille R. Brown, The Eminence of Imminence and the Myopia 
of Markets, 9 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 674, 690–91 (2010) (advocating 
for the use of compulsory licensing for all “clean tech”); see also Deborah Behles, 
The New Race:  Speeding Up Climate Change Innovation, 11 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1, 
26–31, 34–40 (2009) (discussing solutions to promote “green technology” including 
creating a new patent system with compulsory licensing). 
 266. See Lauroesch, supra note 205, at 53 (“Similarly, opponents of 
compulsory licensing argue that such licensing provisions would destroy the 
research incentive that is so integral to the patent system.”). 
 267. See Parthasarathy, supra note 102, at 10 (contrasting geoengineering, 
which “includes a wide range of technologies, from stratospheric sulfate aerosols 
to mirrors to be built in space,” with atomic energy which was defined as 
“fissionable material”). 
 268. See id. at 11 (“The precedent of patentability to the extent that an 
invention is useful in atomic energy is therefore highly applicable to and useful 
in [the] case of geoengineering.”). 
 269. See supra Part III.D. 3. Compulsory Licensing (discussing compulsory 
licensing). 
 270. See supra Part IV.A. Determining Which U.S. Government Action Would 
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would encompass grand schemes for cloud brightening but also 
include the smaller inventions, such as the jet stream, necessary 
to conduct and deploy large-scale SRM technologies. This 
definition of technology susceptible to a potential licensing scheme 
thereby defines the scope of the specialized compulsory licensing 
scheme to encompass pertinent geoengineering technology 
inventions, but also exclude tangentially related inventions that 
are not crucial for geoengineering technology. 
V. Conclusion 
Climate change is one of the biggest problems of our 
generation, and we may have passed the critical tipping point. 
Geoengineering technology may be the only way to substantially 
slow climate change and its effects. However, the current 
development and granting of geoengineering patents raises 
concerns about how the patent system has and will continue to 
incentivize innovation. Creating a compulsory licensing scheme for 
geoengineering technologies—technologies that are useful in 
significantly altering the climate through climate engineering—is 
a viable solution. Not only would this continue to encourage 
licensing practices, but it would also reinforce the national and 
international commitment to developing accurate technology built 
upon robust research and innovative, collaborative thinking. 
 
Best Promote Innovation Given the Unique Features of Geoengineering 
Technology (discussing compulsory licensing with geoengineering). 
